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# Weinberger Hopes to Publicize Soviet Missile Data

By **RICHARD HALLORAN**

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WASHINGTON, July 15 — With the Soviet Union apparently deploying its new medium-range SS-20 nuclear missiles at a rapid pace, Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger has become involved in a dispute with intelligence agencies over publicizing evidence of the deployment, according to Administration officials.

Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr. asserted in a speech in New York yesterday that the Soviet Union already had 750 nuclear warheads deployed on the SS-20's, which was considerably more than previously known, and said that "the pace of the Soviet buildup is increasing."

The Administration officials here said that the Soviet Union had deployed 235 to 250 missile launchers, which supported Mr. Haig's statement since each missile can carry three warheads. Two-thirds of the launchers are aimed at Western Europe and a third at China or other targets in Asia, the officials said. Japanese officials noted today, according to press reports from Tokyo, that SS-20's could reach any target in Japan.

## Deployment Possibly Greater

Mr. Haig and Administration officials may have understated the deployment. Sources with access to intelligence reports said that each launcher might be armed with three or four missiles. They said, however, that the intelligence on that was uncertain.

In any event, Mr. Weinberger has been anxious, the officials said, to make

public photographs and maps of the SS-20 deployments in an effort to generate support here and especially in Western Europe for a United States plan to counter them.

That plan calls for deploying Pershing 2 ballistic missiles and Tomahawk cruise missiles in Western Europe, beginning in 1983. Britain, West Germany, and Italy have agreed to have them on their soil, despite political opposition, but other nations have refused.

The officials said, however, that the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency had adamantly refused to permit any publication of the evidence. The officials said that the intelligence agencies feared disclosure of their methods and the quality of their information.

## Weinberger Briefed Europeans

The idea of publicizing the evidence arose last April, after Mr. Weinberger had sponsored what was said to have been a vivid and successful briefing on the Soviet threat to European defense ministers in Bonn. Mr. Weinberger repeated the briefing a month later in Brussels.

In both cases, the European ministers emerged from the briefing to exclaim on the precision and breadth of the briefing and let it be known that they had asked Mr. Weinberger to make public as much information as possible so that they could persuade their own citizens of the extent of the threat.

Mr. Weinberger told American reporters at the time that he agreed with his European colleagues and would see what could be done. But he ran into immediate resistance, the officials said, with his own intelligence people and with the C.I.A., which is in charge of space satellite reconnaissance.

## Memo for Intelligence Agency

After several months of talks, the officials said, Mr. Weinberger recently wrote a memorandum to the Defense Intelligence Agency, which is nominally under his control, asserting that they must prove to him why the evidence could not be publicized.

The officials said that the intelligence people were adamant in refusing be-

cause any revelation could give the Soviet Union information that would enable them to hide the missiles from United States satellites or other sensors.

It was the age-old conflict, said one senior official, between the desire of the policy-maker to use information to persuade skeptics to accept his course of action and the desire of intelligence officials to protect their ability to collect information.

Mr. Weinberger, the officials said, was groping for a middle road in which maps might be generalized and only the most obvious pictures used. But they said the intelligence agencies had dug in their heels even against that.

## Three Versions of the SS-20

The SS-20 missile comes in three versions, according to a study done by the General Dynamics Corporation, a leading military contractor and builder of cruise missiles. One can carry a 1.5-megaton nuclear warhead for 3,500 miles while a second can carry three smaller warheads aimed at separate targets. A third can carry a 50-kiloton warhead 4,600 miles.

A kiloton is the equivalent of 1,00 tons of TNT. A megaton is the equivalent of a million tons. The atomic bomb that exploded over Hiroshima in 1945 was in the range of 12 to 15 kilotons.

The SS-20 is a two-stage, solid-fuel ballistic missile that can be launched from a tracked transporter.

At the beginning of 1980, the Soviet Union had deployed 100 missile launchers. That number grew to 160 by fall that year, according to intelligence sources. In January 1981, Harold Brown, in his final report to Congress as Secretary of Defense, said the number had grown to 180. Mr. Weinberger reported in April that 220 launchers had been deployed, with the number having moved up to 235 to 250 today.